mirror of
https://github.com/odin-lang/Odin.git
synced 2025-12-28 17:04:34 +00:00
Having the OS/runtime provide a cryptographic entropy source is the right thing to do, and we need it to initialize the default random number generator.
88 lines
2.7 KiB
Odin
88 lines
2.7 KiB
Odin
// A selection of cryptography algorithms and useful helper routines.
|
|
package crypto
|
|
|
|
import "base:runtime"
|
|
import "core:mem"
|
|
|
|
// HAS_RAND_BYTES is true iff the runtime provides a cryptographic
|
|
// entropy source.
|
|
HAS_RAND_BYTES :: runtime.HAS_RAND_BYTES
|
|
|
|
// compare_constant_time returns 1 iff a and b are equal, 0 otherwise.
|
|
//
|
|
// The execution time of this routine is constant regardless of the contents
|
|
// of the slices being compared, as long as the length of the slices is equal.
|
|
// If the length of the two slices is different, it will early-return 0.
|
|
compare_constant_time :: proc "contextless" (a, b: []byte) -> int {
|
|
// If the length of the slices is different, early return.
|
|
//
|
|
// This leaks the fact that the slices have a different length,
|
|
// but the routine is primarily intended for comparing things
|
|
// like MACS and password digests.
|
|
n := len(a)
|
|
if n != len(b) {
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return compare_byte_ptrs_constant_time(raw_data(a), raw_data(b), n)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// compare_byte_ptrs_constant_time returns 1 iff the bytes pointed to by
|
|
// a and b are equal, 0 otherwise.
|
|
//
|
|
// The execution time of this routine is constant regardless of the
|
|
// contents of the memory being compared.
|
|
@(optimization_mode="none")
|
|
compare_byte_ptrs_constant_time :: proc "contextless" (a, b: ^byte, n: int) -> int {
|
|
x := mem.slice_ptr(a, n)
|
|
y := mem.slice_ptr(b, n)
|
|
|
|
v: byte
|
|
for i in 0..<n {
|
|
v |= x[i] ~ y[i]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// After the loop, v == 0 iff a == b. The subtraction will underflow
|
|
// iff v == 0, setting the sign-bit, which gets returned.
|
|
return int((u32(v)-1) >> 31)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// rand_bytes fills the dst buffer with cryptographic entropy taken from
|
|
// the system entropy source. This routine will block if the system entropy
|
|
// source is not ready yet. All system entropy source failures are treated
|
|
// as catastrophic, resulting in a panic.
|
|
//
|
|
// Support for the system entropy source can be checked with the
|
|
// `HAS_RAND_BYTES` boolean constant.
|
|
rand_bytes :: proc (dst: []byte) {
|
|
// zero-fill the buffer first
|
|
mem.zero_explicit(raw_data(dst), len(dst))
|
|
|
|
runtime.rand_bytes(dst)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// random_generator returns a `runtime.Random_Generator` backed by the
|
|
// system entropy source.
|
|
//
|
|
// Support for the system entropy source can be checked with the
|
|
// `HAS_RAND_BYTES` boolean constant.
|
|
random_generator :: proc() -> runtime.Random_Generator {
|
|
return {
|
|
procedure = proc(data: rawptr, mode: runtime.Random_Generator_Mode, p: []byte) {
|
|
switch mode {
|
|
case .Read:
|
|
rand_bytes(p)
|
|
case .Reset:
|
|
// do nothing
|
|
case .Query_Info:
|
|
if len(p) != size_of(runtime.Random_Generator_Query_Info) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
info := (^runtime.Random_Generator_Query_Info)(raw_data(p))
|
|
info^ += {.Uniform, .Cryptographic, .External_Entropy}
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
data = nil,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|