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af7ba2edef
Backport #38323 by @bircni Three independent security hardening fixes, each with a regression test: - **Locale DoS:** the `Locale` middleware passed the raw `Accept-Language` header to `ParseAcceptLanguage`, whose guard only counts `-` while the scanner aliases `_` to `-` — a large `_`-separated header on an unauthenticated request burned CPU. The header is now length-bounded before parsing. - **Public-only token scope:** `GET /teams/{id}/repos`, `.../repos/{org}/{repo}`, `/teams/{id}/activities/feeds`, and `/users/{username}/orgs/{org}/permissions` still returned private repo/activity/permission data to a public-only token. They now filter via `TokenCanAccessRepo` / `ApplyPublicOnly` and reject non-public org permissions. - **Push-option visibility:** `repo.private` / `repo.template` push options were applied to any existing repo, letting an owner/admin silently flip visibility bypassing audit, webhooks, and notifications. They are now honored only on push-to-create. Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
72 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
72 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2020 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package middleware
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import (
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"net/http"
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"gitea.dev/modules/translation"
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"gitea.dev/modules/translation/i18n"
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"golang.org/x/text/language"
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)
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// maxAcceptLanguageLen bounds the Accept-Language header before it reaches
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// language.ParseAcceptLanguage. That parser has quadratic-time behavior on long
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// malformed inputs, and its built-in guard only counts "-" separators while the
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// scanner treats "_" as an alias for "-", so a "_"-heavy header slips past the
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// guard and burns CPU. Only the leading (highest-priority) languages are used, so
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// truncating a longer header is safe.
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const maxAcceptLanguageLen = 200
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// parseAcceptLanguage parses the Accept-Language header after bounding its length
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// to avoid a quadratic-time DoS on attacker-controlled input.
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func parseAcceptLanguage(header string) []language.Tag {
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if len(header) > maxAcceptLanguageLen {
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header = header[:maxAcceptLanguageLen]
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}
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tags, _, _ := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(header)
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return tags
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}
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// Locale handle locale
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func Locale(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) translation.Locale {
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// 1. Check URL arguments.
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lang := req.URL.Query().Get("lang")
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changeLang := lang != ""
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// 2. Get language information from cookies.
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if len(lang) == 0 {
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ck, _ := req.Cookie("lang")
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if ck != nil {
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lang = ck.Value
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}
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}
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// Check again in case someone changes the supported language list.
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if lang != "" && !i18n.DefaultLocales.HasLang(lang) {
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lang = ""
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changeLang = false
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}
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// 3. Get language information from 'Accept-Language'.
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// The first element in the list is chosen to be the default language automatically.
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if len(lang) == 0 {
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tags := parseAcceptLanguage(req.Header.Get("Accept-Language"))
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tag := translation.Match(tags...)
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lang = tag.String()
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}
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if changeLang {
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SetLocaleCookie(resp, lang, 1<<31-1)
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}
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return translation.NewLocale(lang)
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}
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// SetLocaleCookie convenience function to set the locale cookie consistently
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func SetLocaleCookie(resp http.ResponseWriter, lang string, maxAge int) {
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SetSiteCookie(resp, "lang", lang, maxAge)
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}
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