core/crypto/ecdh: Initial import

This commit is contained in:
Yawning Angel
2026-01-03 23:42:06 +09:00
parent 5ce448a8d5
commit c35b49bf60
7 changed files with 597 additions and 178 deletions

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/*
A generic interface to Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
*/
package ecdh

404
core/crypto/ecdh/ecdh.odin Normal file
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package ecdh
import "core:crypto"
import secec "core:crypto/_weierstrass"
import "core:crypto/x25519"
import "core:crypto/x448"
import "core:mem"
import "core:reflect"
// Note: For these primitives scalar size = point size
@(private="file")
X25519_Buf :: [x25519.SCALAR_SIZE]byte
@(private="file")
X448_Buf :: [x448.SCALAR_SIZE]byte
// Curve the curve identifier associated with a given Private_Key
// or Public_Key
Curve :: enum {
Invalid,
SECP256R1,
X25519,
X448,
}
// CURVE_NAMES is the Curve to curve name string.
CURVE_NAMES := [Curve]string {
.Invalid = "Invalid",
.SECP256R1 = "secp256r1",
.X25519 = "X25519",
.X448 = "X448",
}
// PRIVATE_KEY_SIZES is the Curve to private key size in bytes.
PRIVATE_KEY_SIZES := [Curve]int {
.Invalid = 0,
.SECP256R1 = secec.SC_SIZE_P256R1,
.X25519 = x25519.SCALAR_SIZE,
.X448 = x448.SCALAR_SIZE,
}
// PUBLIC_KEY_SIZES is the Curve to public key size in bytes.
PUBLIC_KEY_SIZES := [Curve]int {
.Invalid = 0,
.SECP256R1 = 1 + 2 * secec.FE_SIZE_P256R1,
.X25519 = x25519.POINT_SIZE,
.X448 = x448.POINT_SIZE,
}
// SHARED_SECRET_SIZES is the Curve to shared secret size in bytes.
SHARED_SECRET_SIZES := [Curve]int {
.Invalid = 0,
.SECP256R1 = secec.FE_SIZE_P256R1,
.X25519 = x25519.POINT_SIZE,
.X448 = x448.POINT_SIZE,
}
@(private="file")
_PRIV_IMPL_IDS := [Curve]typeid {
.Invalid = nil,
.SECP256R1 = typeid_of(secec.Scalar_p256r1),
.X25519 = typeid_of(X25519_Buf),
.X448 = typeid_of(X448_Buf),
}
@(private="file")
_PUB_IMPL_IDS := [Curve]typeid {
.Invalid = nil,
.SECP256R1 = typeid_of(secec.Point_p256r1),
.X25519 = typeid_of(X25519_Buf),
.X448 = typeid_of(X448_Buf),
}
// Private_Key is an ECDH private key.
Private_Key :: struct {
// WARNING: All of the members are to be treated as internal (ie:
// the Private_Key structure is intended to be opaque).
_curve: Curve,
_impl: union {
secec.Scalar_p256r1,
X25519_Buf,
X448_Buf,
},
_pub_key: Public_Key,
}
// Public_Key is an ECDH public key.
Public_Key :: struct {
// WARNING: All of the members are to be treated as internal (ie:
// the Public_Key structure is intended to be opaque).
_curve: Curve,
_impl: union {
secec.Point_p256r1,
X25519_Buf,
X448_Buf,
},
}
// private_key_generate uses the system entropy source to generate a new
// Private_Key. This will only fail iff the system entropy source is
// missing or broken.
private_key_generate :: proc(priv_key: ^Private_Key, curve: Curve) -> bool {
private_key_clear(priv_key)
if !crypto.HAS_RAND_BYTES {
return false
}
reflect.set_union_variant_typeid(
priv_key._impl,
_PRIV_IMPL_IDS[curve],
)
#partial switch curve {
case .SECP256R1:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(secec.Scalar_p256r1)
// 384-bits reduced makes the modulo bias insignificant
b: [48]byte = ---
defer (mem.zero_explicit(&b, size_of(b)))
for {
crypto.rand_bytes(b[:])
_ = secec.sc_set_bytes(sc, b[:])
if secec.sc_is_zero(sc) == 0 { // Likely
break
}
}
case .X25519:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(X25519_Buf)
crypto.rand_bytes(sc[:])
case .X448:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(X448_Buf)
crypto.rand_bytes(sc[:])
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
priv_key._curve = curve
private_key_generate_public(priv_key)
return true
}
// private_key_set_bytes decodes a byte-encoded private key, and returns
// true iff the operation was successful.
private_key_set_bytes :: proc(priv_key: ^Private_Key, curve: Curve, b: []byte) -> bool {
private_key_clear(priv_key)
if len(b) != PRIVATE_KEY_SIZES[curve] {
return false
}
reflect.set_union_variant_typeid(
priv_key._impl,
_PRIV_IMPL_IDS[curve],
)
#partial switch curve {
case .SECP256R1:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(secec.Scalar_p256r1)
did_reduce := secec.sc_set_bytes(sc, b)
is_zero := secec.sc_is_zero(sc) == 1
// Reject `0` and scalars that are not less than the
// curve order.
if did_reduce || is_zero {
private_key_clear(priv_key)
return false
}
case .X25519:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(X25519_Buf)
copy(sc[:], b)
case .X448:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(X448_Buf)
copy(sc[:], b)
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
priv_key._curve = curve
private_key_generate_public(priv_key)
return true
}
@(private="file")
private_key_generate_public :: proc(priv_key: ^Private_Key) {
switch &sc in priv_key._impl {
case secec.Scalar_p256r1:
pub_key: secec.Point_p256r1 = ---
secec.pt_scalar_mul_generator(&pub_key, &sc)
secec.pt_rescale(&pub_key, &pub_key)
priv_key._pub_key._impl = pub_key
case X25519_Buf:
pub_key: X25519_Buf = ---
x25519.scalarmult_basepoint(pub_key[:], sc[:])
priv_key._pub_key._impl = pub_key
case X448_Buf:
pub_key: X448_Buf = ---
x448.scalarmult_basepoint(pub_key[:], sc[:])
priv_key._pub_key._impl = pub_key
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
priv_key._pub_key._curve = priv_key._curve
}
// private_key_bytes sets dst to byte-encoding of priv_key.
private_key_bytes :: proc(priv_key: ^Private_Key, dst: []byte) {
ensure(priv_key._curve != .Invalid, "crypto/ecdh: uninitialized private key")
ensure(len(dst) == PRIVATE_KEY_SIZES[priv_key._curve], "crypto/ecdh: invalid destination size")
#partial switch priv_key._curve {
case .SECP256R1:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(secec.Scalar_p256r1)
secec.sc_bytes(dst, sc)
case .X25519:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(X25519_Buf)
copy(dst, sc[:])
case .X448:
sc := &priv_key._impl.(X448_Buf)
copy(dst, sc[:])
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
}
// private_key_equal returns true iff the private keys are equal,
// in constant time.
private_key_equal :: proc(p, q: ^Private_Key) -> bool {
if p._curve != q._curve {
return false
}
#partial switch p._curve {
case .SECP256R1:
sc_p, sc_q := &p._impl.(secec.Scalar_p256r1), &q._impl.(secec.Scalar_p256r1)
return secec.sc_equal(sc_p, sc_q) == 1
case .X25519:
b_p, b_q := &p._impl.(X25519_Buf), &q._impl.(X25519_Buf)
return crypto.compare_constant_time(b_p[:], b_q[:]) == 1
case .X448:
b_p, b_q := &p._impl.(X448_Buf), &q._impl.(X448_Buf)
return crypto.compare_constant_time(b_p[:], b_q[:]) == 1
case:
return false
}
}
// private_key_clear clears priv_key to the uninitialized state.
private_key_clear :: proc "contextless" (priv_key: ^Private_Key) {
mem.zero_explicit(priv_key, size_of(Private_Key))
}
// public_key_set_bytes decodes a byte-encoded public key, and returns
// true iff the operation was successful.
public_key_set_bytes :: proc(pub_key: ^Public_Key, curve: Curve, b: []byte) -> bool {
public_key_clear(pub_key)
if len(b) != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZES[curve] {
return false
}
reflect.set_union_variant_typeid(
pub_key._impl,
_PUB_IMPL_IDS[curve],
)
#partial switch curve {
case .SECP256R1:
if b[0] != secec.SEC_PREFIX_UNCOMPRESSED {
return false
}
pt := &pub_key._impl.(secec.Point_p256r1)
ok := secec.pt_set_sec_bytes(pt, b)
if !ok || secec.pt_is_identity(pt) == 1 {
return false
}
case .X25519:
pt := &pub_key._impl.(X25519_Buf)
copy(pt[:], b)
case .X448:
pt := &pub_key._impl.(X448_Buf)
copy(pt[:], b)
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
pub_key._curve = curve
return true
}
// public_key_set_priv sets pub_key to the public component of priv_key.
public_key_set_priv :: proc(pub_key: ^Public_Key, priv_key: ^Private_Key) {
ensure(priv_key._curve != .Invalid, "crypto/ecdh: uninitialized private key")
public_key_clear(pub_key)
pub_key^ = priv_key._pub_key
}
// public_key_bytes sets dst to byte-encoding of pub_key.
public_key_bytes :: proc(pub_key: ^Public_Key, dst: []byte) {
ensure(pub_key._curve != .Invalid, "crypto/ecdh: uninitialized public key")
ensure(len(dst) == PUBLIC_KEY_SIZES[pub_key._curve], "crypto/ecdh: invalid destination size")
#partial switch pub_key._curve {
case .SECP256R1:
// Invariant: Unless the caller is manually building pub_key
// `Z = 1`, so we can skip the rescale.
pt := &pub_key._impl.(secec.Point_p256r1)
dst[0] = secec.SEC_PREFIX_UNCOMPRESSED
secec.fe_bytes(dst[1:1+secec.FE_SIZE_P256R1], &pt.x)
secec.fe_bytes(dst[1+secec.FE_SIZE_P256R1:], &pt.y)
case .X25519:
pt := &pub_key._impl.(X25519_Buf)
copy(dst, pt[:])
case .X448:
pt := &pub_key._impl.(X448_Buf)
copy(dst, pt[:])
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
}
// public_key_equal returns true iff the public keys are equal,
// in constant time.
public_key_equal :: proc(p, q: ^Public_Key) -> bool {
if p._curve != q._curve {
return false
}
#partial switch p._curve {
case .SECP256R1:
pt_p, pt_q := &p._impl.(secec.Point_p256r1), &q._impl.(secec.Point_p256r1)
return secec.pt_equal(pt_p, pt_q) == 1
case .X25519:
b_p, b_q := &p._impl.(X25519_Buf), &q._impl.(X25519_Buf)
return crypto.compare_constant_time(b_p[:], b_q[:]) == 1
case .X448:
b_p, b_q := &p._impl.(X448_Buf), &q._impl.(X448_Buf)
return crypto.compare_constant_time(b_p[:], b_q[:]) == 1
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
}
// public_key_clear clears pub_key to the uninitialized state.
public_key_clear :: proc "contextless" (pub_key: ^Public_Key) {
mem.zero_explicit(pub_key, size_of(Public_Key))
}
// ecdh performs an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange betwween
// the Private_Key and Public_Key, writing the shared secret to dst.
//
// The neutral element is rejected as an error.
@(require_results)
ecdh :: proc(priv_key: ^Private_Key, pub_key: ^Public_Key, dst: []byte) -> bool {
ensure(priv_key._curve == pub_key._curve, "crypto/ecdh: curve mismatch")
ensure(pub_key._curve != .Invalid, "crypto/ecdh: uninitialized public key")
ensure(len(dst) == SHARED_SECRET_SIZES[priv_key._curve], "crypto/ecdh: invalid shared secret size")
#partial switch priv_key._curve {
case .SECP256R1:
sc, pt := &priv_key._impl.(secec.Scalar_p256r1), &pub_key._impl.(secec.Point_p256r1)
ss: secec.Point_p256r1
defer secec.pt_clear(&ss)
secec.pt_scalar_mul(&ss, pt, sc)
return secec.pt_bytes(dst, nil, &ss)
case .X25519:
sc, pt := &priv_key._impl.(X25519_Buf), &pub_key._impl.(X25519_Buf)
x25519.scalarmult(dst, sc[:], pt[:])
case .X448:
sc, pt := &priv_key._impl.(X448_Buf), &pub_key._impl.(X448_Buf)
x448.scalarmult(dst, sc[:], pt[:])
case:
panic("crypto/ecdh: invalid curve")
}
// X25519/X448 check for all zero digest.
return crypto.is_zero_constant_time(dst) == 0
}
// curve returns the Curve used by a Private_Key or Public_Key instance.
curve :: proc(k: ^$T) -> Curve where(T == Private_Key || T == Public_Key) {
return k._curve
}
// key_size returns the key size of a Private_Key or Public_Key in bytes.
key_size :: proc(k: ^$T) -> int where(T == Private_Key || T == Public_Key) {
when T == Private_Key {
return PRIVATE_KEY_SIZES[k._curve]
} else {
return PUBLIC_KEY_SIZES[k._curve]
}
}
// shared_secret_size returns the shared secret size of a key exchange
// in bytes.
shared_secret_size :: proc(k: ^$T) -> int where(T == Private_Key || T == Public_Key) {
return SHARED_SECRET_SIZES[k._curve]
}

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@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ package all
@(require) import "core:crypto/chacha20poly1305"
@(require) import chash "core:crypto/hash"
@(require) import "core:crypto/deoxysii"
@(require) import "core:crypto/ecdh"
@(require) import "core:crypto/ed25519"
@(require) import "core:crypto/hkdf"
@(require) import "core:crypto/hmac"

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@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ package all
@(require) import "core:crypto/chacha20poly1305"
@(require) import chash "core:crypto/hash"
@(require) import "core:crypto/deoxysii"
@(require) import "core:crypto/ecdh"
@(require) import "core:crypto/ed25519"
@(require) import "core:crypto/hkdf"
@(require) import "core:crypto/hmac"

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@@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ package benchmark_core_crypto
import "base:runtime"
import "core:encoding/hex"
import "core:log"
import "core:testing"
import "core:text/table"
import "core:time"
import "core:crypto"
import "core:crypto/ecdh"
import "core:crypto/ed25519"
import "core:crypto/x25519"
import "core:crypto/x448"
@(private = "file")
ECDH_ITERS :: 10000
@@ -25,6 +26,10 @@ benchmark_crypto_ecc :: proc(t: ^testing.T) {
@(private = "file")
bench_ecdh :: proc() {
if !crypto.HAS_RAND_BYTES {
log.warnf("ECDH benchmarks skipped, no system entropy source")
}
tbl: table.Table
table.init(&tbl)
defer table.destroy(&tbl)
@@ -42,63 +47,37 @@ bench_ecdh :: proc() {
)
}
scalar_bp, scalar := bench_x25519()
append_tbl(&tbl, "X25519", scalar_bp, scalar)
for algo in ecdh.Curve {
if algo == .Invalid {
continue
}
algo_name := ecdh.CURVE_NAMES[algo]
scalar_bp, scalar = bench_x448()
append_tbl(&tbl, "X448", scalar_bp, scalar)
priv_key_alice: ecdh.Private_Key
start := time.tick_now()
for _ in 0 ..< ECDH_ITERS {
_ = ecdh.private_key_generate(&priv_key_alice, algo)
}
bp := time.tick_since(start) / ECDH_ITERS
pub_key_alice: ecdh.Public_Key
ecdh.public_key_set_priv(&pub_key_alice, &priv_key_alice)
priv_key_bob: ecdh.Private_Key
_ = ecdh.private_key_generate(&priv_key_bob, algo)
ss := make([]byte, ecdh.SHARED_SECRET_SIZES[algo], context.temp_allocator)
start = time.tick_now()
for _ in 0 ..< ECDH_ITERS {
_ = ecdh.ecdh(&priv_key_bob, &pub_key_alice, ss)
}
sc := time.tick_since(start) / ECDH_ITERS
append_tbl(&tbl, algo_name, bp, sc)
}
log_table(&tbl)
}
@(private = "file")
bench_x25519 :: proc() -> (bp, sc: time.Duration) {
point_str := "deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef"
scalar_str := "cafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabe"
point, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(point_str), context.temp_allocator)
scalar, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(scalar_str), context.temp_allocator)
out: [x25519.POINT_SIZE]byte = ---
start := time.tick_now()
for _ in 0 ..< ECDH_ITERS {
x25519.scalarmult_basepoint(out[:], scalar[:])
}
bp = time.tick_since(start) / ECDH_ITERS
start = time.tick_now()
for _ in 0 ..< ECDH_ITERS {
x25519.scalarmult(out[:], scalar[:], point[:])
}
sc = time.tick_since(start) / ECDH_ITERS
return
}
@(private = "file")
bench_x448 :: proc() -> (bp, sc: time.Duration) {
point_str := "deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef"
scalar_str := "cafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabe"
point, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(point_str), context.temp_allocator)
scalar, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(scalar_str), context.temp_allocator)
out: [x448.POINT_SIZE]byte = ---
start := time.tick_now()
for _ in 0 ..< ECDH_ITERS {
x448.scalarmult_basepoint(out[:], scalar[:])
}
bp = time.tick_since(start) / ECDH_ITERS
start = time.tick_now()
for _ in 0 ..< ECDH_ITERS {
x448.scalarmult(out[:], scalar[:], point[:])
}
sc = time.tick_since(start) / ECDH_ITERS
return
}
@(private = "file")
bench_dsa :: proc() {
tbl: table.Table

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@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
package test_core_crypto
import "core:encoding/hex"
import "core:testing"
import "core:crypto/ecdh"
@(test)
test_ecdh :: proc(t: ^testing.T) {
test_vectors := []struct {
curve: ecdh.Curve,
scalar: string,
point: string,
product: string,
} {
// X25519 Test vectors from RFC 7748
{
.X25519,
"a546e36bf0527c9d3b16154b82465edd62144c0ac1fc5a18506a2244ba449ac4",
"e6db6867583030db3594c1a424b15f7c726624ec26b3353b10a903a6d0ab1c4c",
"c3da55379de9c6908e94ea4df28d084f32eccf03491c71f754b4075577a28552",
},
{
.X25519,
"4b66e9d4d1b4673c5ad22691957d6af5c11b6421e0ea01d42ca4169e7918ba0d",
"e5210f12786811d3f4b7959d0538ae2c31dbe7106fc03c3efc4cd549c715a493",
"95cbde9476e8907d7aade45cb4b873f88b595a68799fa152e6f8f7647aac7957",
},
// X448 Test vectors from RFC 7748
{
.X448,
"3d262fddf9ec8e88495266fea19a34d28882acef045104d0d1aae121700a779c984c24f8cdd78fbff44943eba368f54b29259a4f1c600ad3",
"06fce640fa3487bfda5f6cf2d5263f8aad88334cbd07437f020f08f9814dc031ddbdc38c19c6da2583fa5429db94ada18aa7a7fb4ef8a086",
"ce3e4ff95a60dc6697da1db1d85e6afbdf79b50a2412d7546d5f239fe14fbaadeb445fc66a01b0779d98223961111e21766282f73dd96b6f",
},
{
.X448,
"203d494428b8399352665ddca42f9de8fef600908e0d461cb021f8c538345dd77c3e4806e25f46d3315c44e0a5b4371282dd2c8d5be3095f",
"0fbcc2f993cd56d3305b0b7d9e55d4c1a8fb5dbb52f8e9a1e9b6201b165d015894e56c4d3570bee52fe205e28a78b91cdfbde71ce8d157db",
"884a02576239ff7a2f2f63b2db6a9ff37047ac13568e1e30fe63c4a7ad1b3ee3a5700df34321d62077e63633c575c1c954514e99da7c179d",
},
// secp256r1 Test vectors (subset) from NIST CAVP
{
.SECP256R1,
"7d7dc5f71eb29ddaf80d6214632eeae03d9058af1fb6d22ed80badb62bc1a534",
"04700c48f77f56584c5cc632ca65640db91b6bacce3a4df6b42ce7cc838833d287db71e509e3fd9b060ddb20ba5c51dcc5948d46fbf640dfe0441782cab85fa4ac",
"46fc62106420ff012e54a434fbdd2d25ccc5852060561e68040dd7778997bd7b",
},
{
.SECP256R1,
"38f65d6dce47676044d58ce5139582d568f64bb16098d179dbab07741dd5caf5",
"04809f04289c64348c01515eb03d5ce7ac1a8cb9498f5caa50197e58d43a86a7aeb29d84e811197f25eba8f5194092cb6ff440e26d4421011372461f579271cda3",
"057d636096cb80b67a8c038c890e887d1adfa4195e9b3ce241c8a778c59cda67",
},
}
for v, _ in test_vectors {
raw_scalar, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(v.scalar), context.temp_allocator)
raw_point, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(v.point), context.temp_allocator)
pub_key: ecdh.Public_Key
priv_key: ecdh.Private_Key
ok := ecdh.private_key_set_bytes(&priv_key, v.curve, raw_scalar)
testing.expectf(t, ok, "failed to deserialize private key: %v %x", v.curve, raw_scalar)
ok = ecdh.public_key_set_bytes(&pub_key, v.curve, raw_point)
testing.expectf(t, ok, "failed to deserialize public key: %v %x", v.curve, raw_scalar)
shared_secret := make([]byte, ecdh.shared_secret_size(&pub_key), context.temp_allocator)
ok = ecdh.ecdh(&priv_key, &pub_key, shared_secret)
testing.expectf(t, ok, "ecdh failed: %v %v %v", v.curve, &priv_key, &pub_key)
ss_str := string(hex.encode(shared_secret, context.temp_allocator))
testing.expectf(
t,
ss_str == v.product,
"Expected %s for %v %s * %s, but got %s instead",
v.product,
v.curve,
v.scalar,
v.point,
ss_str,
)
}
}
@(test)
test_ecdh_scalar_basemult :: proc(t: ^testing.T) {
test_vectors := []struct {
curve: ecdh.Curve,
scalar : string,
point: string,
} {
// X25519 from RFC 7748 6.1
{
.X25519,
"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a",
"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a",
},
{
.X25519,
"5dab087e624a8a4b79e17f8b83800ee66f3bb1292618b6fd1c2f8b27ff88e0eb",
"de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f",
},
// X448 from RFC 7748 6.2
{
.X448,
"9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b",
"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0",
},
{
.X448,
"1c306a7ac2a0e2e0990b294470cba339e6453772b075811d8fad0d1d6927c120bb5ee8972b0d3e21374c9c921b09d1b0366f10b65173992d",
"3eb7a829b0cd20f5bcfc0b599b6feccf6da4627107bdb0d4f345b43027d8b972fc3e34fb4232a13ca706dcb57aec3dae07bdc1c67bf33609",
},
// secp256r1 Test vectors (subset) from NIST CAVP
{
.SECP256R1,
"7d7dc5f71eb29ddaf80d6214632eeae03d9058af1fb6d22ed80badb62bc1a534",
"04ead218590119e8876b29146ff89ca61770c4edbbf97d38ce385ed281d8a6b23028af61281fd35e2fa7002523acc85a429cb06ee6648325389f59edfce1405141",
},
{
.SECP256R1,
"38f65d6dce47676044d58ce5139582d568f64bb16098d179dbab07741dd5caf5",
"04119f2f047902782ab0c9e27a54aff5eb9b964829ca99c06b02ddba95b0a3f6d08f52b726664cac366fc98ac7a012b2682cbd962e5acb544671d41b9445704d1d",
},
}
for v, _ in test_vectors {
raw_scalar, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(v.scalar), context.temp_allocator)
priv_key: ecdh.Private_Key
pub_key: ecdh.Public_Key
ok := ecdh.private_key_set_bytes(&priv_key, v.curve, raw_scalar)
testing.expectf(t, ok, "failed to deserialize private key: %v %x", v.curve, raw_scalar)
ecdh.public_key_set_priv(&pub_key, &priv_key)
b := make([]byte, ecdh.key_size(&pub_key), context.temp_allocator)
ecdh.public_key_bytes(&pub_key, b)
pub_str := string(hex.encode(b, context.temp_allocator))
testing.expectf(
t,
pub_str == v.point,
"Expected %s for %v %s * G, but got %s instead",
v.point,
v.curve,
v.scalar,
pub_str,
)
}
}

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ import "core:testing"
import field "core:crypto/_fiat/field_curve25519"
import "core:crypto/ed25519"
import "core:crypto/ristretto255"
import "core:crypto/x25519"
import "core:crypto/x448"
@(test)
test_edwards25519_sqrt_ratio_m1 :: proc(t: ^testing.T) {
@@ -625,128 +623,6 @@ test_ed25519 :: proc(t: ^testing.T) {
}
}
@(test)
test_x25519 :: proc(t: ^testing.T) {
// Local copy of this so that the base point doesn't need to be exported.
_BASE_POINT: [32]byte = {
9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
}
test_vectors := []struct {
scalar: string,
point: string,
product: string,
} {
// Test vectors from RFC 7748
{
"a546e36bf0527c9d3b16154b82465edd62144c0ac1fc5a18506a2244ba449ac4",
"e6db6867583030db3594c1a424b15f7c726624ec26b3353b10a903a6d0ab1c4c",
"c3da55379de9c6908e94ea4df28d084f32eccf03491c71f754b4075577a28552",
},
{
"4b66e9d4d1b4673c5ad22691957d6af5c11b6421e0ea01d42ca4169e7918ba0d",
"e5210f12786811d3f4b7959d0538ae2c31dbe7106fc03c3efc4cd549c715a493",
"95cbde9476e8907d7aade45cb4b873f88b595a68799fa152e6f8f7647aac7957",
},
}
for v, _ in test_vectors {
scalar, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(v.scalar), context.temp_allocator)
point, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(v.point), context.temp_allocator)
derived_point: [x25519.POINT_SIZE]byte
x25519.scalarmult(derived_point[:], scalar[:], point[:])
derived_point_str := string(hex.encode(derived_point[:], context.temp_allocator))
testing.expectf(
t,
derived_point_str == v.product,
"Expected %s for %s * %s, but got %s instead",
v.product,
v.scalar,
v.point,
derived_point_str,
)
// Abuse the test vectors to sanity-check the scalar-basepoint multiply.
p1, p2: [x25519.POINT_SIZE]byte
x25519.scalarmult_basepoint(p1[:], scalar[:])
x25519.scalarmult(p2[:], scalar[:], _BASE_POINT[:])
p1_str := string(hex.encode(p1[:], context.temp_allocator))
p2_str := string(hex.encode(p2[:], context.temp_allocator))
testing.expectf(
t,
p1_str == p2_str,
"Expected %s for %s * basepoint, but got %s instead",
p2_str,
v.scalar,
p1_str,
)
}
}
@(test)
test_x448 :: proc(t: ^testing.T) {
// Local copy of this so that the base point doesn't need to be exported.
_BASE_POINT: [56]byte = {
5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
}
test_vectors := []struct {
scalar: string,
point: string,
product: string,
} {
// Test vectors from RFC 7748
{
"3d262fddf9ec8e88495266fea19a34d28882acef045104d0d1aae121700a779c984c24f8cdd78fbff44943eba368f54b29259a4f1c600ad3",
"06fce640fa3487bfda5f6cf2d5263f8aad88334cbd07437f020f08f9814dc031ddbdc38c19c6da2583fa5429db94ada18aa7a7fb4ef8a086",
"ce3e4ff95a60dc6697da1db1d85e6afbdf79b50a2412d7546d5f239fe14fbaadeb445fc66a01b0779d98223961111e21766282f73dd96b6f",
},
{
"203d494428b8399352665ddca42f9de8fef600908e0d461cb021f8c538345dd77c3e4806e25f46d3315c44e0a5b4371282dd2c8d5be3095f",
"0fbcc2f993cd56d3305b0b7d9e55d4c1a8fb5dbb52f8e9a1e9b6201b165d015894e56c4d3570bee52fe205e28a78b91cdfbde71ce8d157db",
"884a02576239ff7a2f2f63b2db6a9ff37047ac13568e1e30fe63c4a7ad1b3ee3a5700df34321d62077e63633c575c1c954514e99da7c179d",
},
}
for v, _ in test_vectors {
scalar, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(v.scalar), context.temp_allocator)
point, _ := hex.decode(transmute([]byte)(v.point), context.temp_allocator)
derived_point: [x448.POINT_SIZE]byte
x448.scalarmult(derived_point[:], scalar[:], point[:])
derived_point_str := string(hex.encode(derived_point[:], context.temp_allocator))
testing.expectf(
t,
derived_point_str == v.product,
"Expected %s for %s * %s, but got %s instead",
v.product,
v.scalar,
v.point,
derived_point_str,
)
// Abuse the test vectors to sanity-check the scalar-basepoint multiply.
p1, p2: [x448.POINT_SIZE]byte
x448.scalarmult_basepoint(p1[:], scalar[:])
x448.scalarmult(p2[:], scalar[:], _BASE_POINT[:])
p1_str := string(hex.encode(p1[:], context.temp_allocator))
p2_str := string(hex.encode(p2[:], context.temp_allocator))
testing.expectf(
t,
p1_str == p2_str,
"Expected %s for %s * basepoint, but got %s instead",
p2_str,
v.scalar,
p1_str,
)
}
}
@(private="file")
ge_str :: proc(ge: ^ristretto255.Group_Element) -> string {
b: [ristretto255.ELEMENT_SIZE]byte