core/crypto: Add constant-time memory comparison routines

Using a constant-time comparison is required when comparing things like
MACs, password digests, and etc to avoid exposing sensitive data via
trivial timing attacks.

These routines could also live under core:mem, but they are somewhat
specialized, and are likely only useful for cryptographic applications.
This commit is contained in:
Yawning Angel
2021-11-06 02:36:30 +00:00
parent 9be0d18e5d
commit d1e76ee4f2

41
core/crypto/crypto.odin Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
package crypto
import "core:mem"
// compare_constant_time returns 1 iff a and b are equal, 0 otherwise.
//
// The execution time of this routine is constant regardless of the contents
// of the slices being compared, as long as the length of the slices is equal.
// If the length of the two slices is different, it will early-return 0.
compare_constant_time :: proc "contextless" (a, b: []byte) -> int {
// If the length of the slices is different, early return.
//
// This leaks the fact that the slices have a different length,
// but the routine is primarily intended for comparing things
// like MACS and password digests.
n := len(a)
if n != len(b) {
return 0
}
return compare_byte_ptrs_constant_time(raw_data(a), raw_data(b), n)
}
// compare_byte_ptrs_constant_time returns 1 iff the bytes pointed to by
// a and b are equal, 0 otherwise.
//
// The execution time of this routine is constant regardless of the
// contents of the memory being compared.
compare_byte_ptrs_constant_time :: proc "contextless" (a, b: ^byte, n: int) -> int {
x := mem.slice_ptr(a, n)
y := mem.slice_ptr(b, n)
v: byte
for i in 0..<n {
v |= x[i] ~ y[i]
}
// After the loop, v == 0 iff a == b. The subtraction will underflow
// iff v == 0, setting the sign-bit, which gets returned.
return int((u32(v)-1) >> 31)
}