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relax roots

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kalsprite
2026-06-14 00:16:41 -07:00
parent 4876cf03bf
commit ef0e991437
1 changed files with 33 additions and 10 deletions
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43
core/crypto/x509/verify.odin
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@@ -221,12 +221,12 @@ _MAX_SIG_CHECKS :: 100
// opts.required_eku is set the leaf AND every intermediate must permit
// that purpose (e.g. an email-only sub-CA cannot issue a TLS server leaf).
//
// The trust anchor is checked like any issuer (validity, CA /
// keyCertSign, pathLenConstraint, no uninterpreted critical extension),
// except that its own self-signature is not re-verified, since it is
// trusted a priori. An expired or malformed root is therefore rejected;
// resilience to that comes from the search trying every other available
// anchor and intermediate.
// The trust anchor is treated as trusted input, as in Go and OpenSSL: it
// must be valid at opts.current_time and is name-chained + signature-checked
// as the issuer below it, but its CA authorization (basicConstraints /
// keyCertSign / pathLenConstraint) and its own self-signature are NOT
// re-checked. An expired anchor is still rejected; resilience to that comes
// from the search trying every other available anchor and intermediate.
//
@(require_results)
verify_chain :: proc(
@@ -330,11 +330,13 @@ _build_to_anchor :: proc(
// Non-self-issued intermediates already beneath the next issuer, for the pathLenConstraint check (RFC 5280 section 6.1.4)
below := _non_self_issued_below(acc)
// Prefer terminating at a trust anchor. The anchor must have issued `cert` (name chaining + signature) and,
// like any CA, be fit to act as an issuer: valid at `now`, a CA with keyCertSign, within its pathLenConstraint,
// no uninterpreted critical extension. Its own self-signature is NOT re-verified; it is trusted a priori.
// Prefer terminating at a trust anchor. The anchor must have issued `cert`
// (name chaining + signature) and be valid at `now`, but as TRUSTED INPUT
// its CA authorization (basicConstraints / keyCertSign / pathLenConstraint)
// and its own self-signature are NOT re-checked, matching how Go and
// OpenSSL treat roots. See _anchor_usable.
for root in opts.roots {
if !_is_issuer_of(root, cert) || !_issuer_usable(root, opts.current_time, below) {
if !_is_issuer_of(root, cert) || !_anchor_usable(root, opts.current_time) {
continue
}
if budget^ <= 0 {
@@ -449,6 +451,27 @@ _issuer_usable :: proc(issuer: ^Certificate, now: time.Time, below: int) -> bool
return true
}
// The anchor is trusted input, so unlike _issuer_usable its CA authorization
// (basicConstraints / keyCertSign / pathLenConstraint) and self-signature are
// NOT re-checked, matching Go and OpenSSL's treatment of roots. Still required:
// valid at `now` (Go and OpenSSL both enforce this; resilience to an expired
// anchor comes from the search trying other anchors/intermediates), no
// uninterpreted critical extension, and no name constraints (which we cannot
// enforce, so refuse rather than ignore).
@(private)
_anchor_usable :: proc(anchor: ^Certificate, now: time.Time) -> bool {
if anchor.unhandled_critical {
return false
}
if _has_extension(anchor, _OID_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS) {
return false
}
if _check_validity(anchor, now) != .None {
return false
}
return true
}
// Reports whether `cert` allows the given Extended Key Usage purpose:
// no EKU extension means unrestricted, anyExtendedKeyUsage
// permits everything, otherwise the purpose must be listed. Applied to