fix: revert git clone http redirection forbidden (#38530)

Revert to 1.26 behavior.

Incomplete, HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection can be improved
This commit is contained in:
wxiaoguang
2026-07-20 18:04:23 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 2fec2affc4
commit 6525e6df15
4 changed files with 24 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package git
import "gitea.dev/modules/git/gitcmd"
func HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection(cmd *gitcmd.Command, targets ...string) {
// Protect from SSRF vector (e.g. migrating from an attacker URL).
// cmd.AddConfig("http.followRedirects", "false")
// However, we can't do so at the moment:
// this fails due to 301: git -c http.followRedirects=false clone -v https://gitlab.com/{owner}/{repo}
// this succeeds: git -c http.followRedirects=false clone -v https://gitlab.com/{owner}/{repo}.git
// FIXME: GIT-CLONE-HTTP-REDIRECT-SSRF: need a complete solution in the future
}

View File

@@ -151,9 +151,7 @@ func Clone(ctx context.Context, from, to string, opts CloneRepoOptions) error {
}
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand().AddArguments("clone")
// Never follow HTTP redirects: no clone caller needs them, and a remote redirecting to an
// otherwise-blocked address would be an SSRF vector (e.g. migrating from an attacker URL).
cmd.AddArguments("-c", "http.followRedirects=false")
HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection(cmd, from, to)
if opts.SkipTLSVerify {
cmd.AddArguments("-c", "http.sslVerify=false")
}

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ func TestRepoIsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
// TestCloneRefusesRedirects ensures Clone never follows HTTP redirects, so a remote
// cannot redirect to an otherwise-blocked address (SSRF, e.g. during migration).
func TestCloneRefusesRedirects(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("FIXME: GIT-CLONE-HTTP-REDIRECT-SSRF: need a complete solution in the future")
var targetHit atomic.Bool
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
targetHit.Store(true)

View File

@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ func UpdateAddress(ctx context.Context, m *repo_model.Mirror, addr string) error
}
func pruneBrokenReferences(ctx context.Context, m *repo_model.Mirror, repoLogName string, gitRepo git.RepositoryFacade, timeout time.Duration) error {
// Never follow HTTP redirects, see cmdFetch in runSync.
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand("remote", "prune").AddConfig("http.followRedirects", "false").AddDynamicArguments(m.GetRemoteName()).WithTimeout(timeout)
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand("remote", "prune").AddDynamicArguments(m.GetRemoteName()).WithTimeout(timeout)
git.HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection(cmd, m.GetRemoteName())
stdout, _, pruneErr := cmd.WithRepo(gitRepo).RunStdString(ctx)
if pruneErr != nil {
// sanitize the output, since it may contain the remote address, which may contain a password
@@ -129,9 +129,8 @@ func runSync(ctx context.Context, m *repo_model.Mirror) ([]*repo_module.SyncResu
// use fetch but not remote update because git fetch support --tags but remote update doesn't
cmdFetch := func() *gitcmd.Command {
// Never follow HTTP redirects: a mirror remote that later starts redirecting to an
// otherwise-blocked address would be an SSRF/exfiltration vector on scheduled syncs.
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand("fetch", "--tags").AddConfig("http.followRedirects", "false")
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand("fetch", "--tags")
git.HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection(cmd, m.GetRemoteName())
if m.EnablePrune {
cmd.AddArguments("--prune")
}
@@ -212,9 +211,9 @@ func runSync(ctx context.Context, m *repo_model.Mirror) ([]*repo_module.SyncResu
}
cmdRemoteUpdatePrune := func() *gitcmd.Command {
// Never follow HTTP redirects, see cmdFetch above.
return gitcmd.NewCommand("remote", "update", "--prune").AddConfig("http.followRedirects", "false").
AddDynamicArguments(m.GetRemoteName()).WithTimeout(timeout).WithEnv(envs)
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand("remote", "update", "--prune").AddDynamicArguments(m.GetRemoteName()).WithTimeout(timeout).WithEnv(envs)
git.HandleGitCmdHTTPRedirection(cmd, m.GetRemoteName())
return cmd
}
if repo_service.HasWiki(ctx, m.Repo) {