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fix(oauth): restrict introspection to the token's client (#38042)

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Bind OAuth token introspection responses to the authenticated client.
Return an inactive response when the token grant belongs to a different
OAuth application to avoid leaking token metadata across clients.

Add integration coverage for cross-client introspection attempts against
both access tokens and refresh tokens.

Assisted-by: GPT-5.4
This commit is contained in:
Lunny Xiao
2026-06-28 01:06:33 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 0319358e5e
commit c9920b7bd0
2 changed files with 112 additions and 16 deletions
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52
routers/web/auth/oauth2_provider.go
View File

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ func InfoOAuth(ctx *context.Context) {
// IntrospectOAuth introspects an oauth token
func IntrospectOAuth(ctx *context.Context) {
clientIDValid := false
var introspectingApp *auth.OAuth2Application
authHeader := ctx.Req.Header.Get("Authorization")
if parsed, ok := httpauth.ParseAuthorizationHeader(authHeader); ok && parsed.BasicAuth != nil {
clientID, clientSecret := parsed.BasicAuth.Username, parsed.BasicAuth.Password
@@ -139,9 +139,14 @@ func IntrospectOAuth(ctx *context.Context) {
ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
clientIDValid = err == nil && app.ValidateClientSecret([]byte(clientSecret))
clientIDValid := err == nil && app.ValidateClientSecret([]byte(clientSecret))
if clientIDValid {
introspectingApp = app
}
}
if !clientIDValid {
if introspectingApp == nil {
// RFC 7662 requires the caller to authenticate to the introspection endpoint.
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662.html#section-2.1
ctx.Resp.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="Gitea OAuth2"`)
ctx.PlainText(http.StatusUnauthorized, "no valid authorization")
return
@@ -156,21 +161,36 @@ func IntrospectOAuth(ctx *context.Context) {
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*forms.IntrospectTokenForm)
token, err := oauth2_provider.ParseToken(form.Token, oauth2_provider.DefaultSigningKey)
if err == nil {
grant, err := auth.GetOAuth2GrantByID(ctx, token.GrantID)
if err == nil && grant != nil {
app, err := auth.GetOAuth2ApplicationByID(ctx, grant.ApplicationID)
if err == nil && app != nil {
response.Active = true
response.Scope = grant.Scope
response.RegisteredClaims = oauth2_provider.NewJwtRegisteredClaimsFromUser(app.ClientID, grant.UserID, nil /*exp*/)
}
if user, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, grant.UserID); err == nil {
response.Username = user.Name
}
}
if err != nil {
// RFC 7662 returns inactive token metadata for invalid/unknown tokens.
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662.html#section-2.2
log.Trace("Ignoring invalid token during introspection: %v", err)
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, response)
return
}
grant, err := auth.GetOAuth2GrantByID(ctx, token.GrantID)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("GetOAuth2GrantByID", err)
return
}
if grant == nil || grant.ApplicationID != introspectingApp.ID {
// RFC 7662 allows the server to reply inactive when the caller must not learn more.
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662.html#section-2.2
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, response)
return
}
response.Active = true
response.Scope = grant.Scope
response.RegisteredClaims = oauth2_provider.NewJwtRegisteredClaimsFromUser(introspectingApp.ClientID, grant.UserID, nil /*exp*/)
user, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, grant.UserID)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("GetUserByID", err)
return
}
response.Username = user.Name
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, response)
}

76
tests/integration/oauth_test.go
View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ import (
"gitea.dev/tests"
"github.com/PuerkitoBio/goquery"
jwt "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/markbates/goth"
"github.com/markbates/goth/gothic"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -122,6 +124,7 @@ func TestOAuth2(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("RefreshTokenInvalidation", testRefreshTokenInvalidation)
t.Run("RefreshTokenCrossClientUsage", testRefreshTokenCrossClientUsage)
t.Run("OAuthIntrospection", testOAuthIntrospection)
t.Run("OAuthIntrospectionCrossClientIsolation", testOAuthIntrospectionCrossClientIsolation)
t.Run("OAuthGrantScopesReadUserFailRepos", testOAuthGrantScopesReadUserFailRepos)
t.Run("OAuthGrantScopesBasicRespectsWriteUser", testOAuthGrantScopesBasicRespectsWriteUser)
t.Run("OAuthGrantScopesReadRepositoryFailOrganization", testOAuthGrantScopesReadRepositoryFailOrganization)
@@ -705,6 +708,79 @@ func testOAuthIntrospection(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, resp.Body.String(), "no valid authorization")
}
func testOAuthIntrospectionCrossClientIsolation(t *testing.T) {
resourceOwner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
clientA := createOAuthTestApplication(t, "user1", "introspection-primary-client", []string{"https://primary.example/oauth/callback"})
clientB := createOAuthTestApplication(t, "user2", "introspection-secondary-client", []string{"https://secondary.example/oauth/callback"})
code, verifier := issueOAuthAuthorizationCode(t, resourceOwner, clientA, clientA.RedirectURIs[0], "openid profile")
req := NewRequestWithValues(t, "POST", "/login/oauth/access_token", map[string]string{
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"client_id": clientA.ClientID,
"client_secret": clientA.ClientSecret,
"redirect_uri": clientA.RedirectURIs[0],
"code": code,
"code_verifier": verifier,
})
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
type tokenResponse struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
}
tokenParsed := new(tokenResponse)
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(resp.Body.Bytes(), tokenParsed))
require.NotEmpty(t, tokenParsed.AccessToken)
require.NotEmpty(t, tokenParsed.RefreshToken)
type introspectResponse struct {
Active bool `json:"active"`
Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`
Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
jwt.RegisteredClaims
}
assertBlockedIntrospection := func(token string) {
t.Helper()
req = NewRequestWithValues(t, "POST", "/login/oauth/introspect", map[string]string{
"token": token,
})
req.SetBasicAuth(clientB.ClientID, clientB.ClientSecret)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
blocked := new(introspectResponse)
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(resp.Body.Bytes(), blocked))
assert.False(t, blocked.Active)
assert.Empty(t, blocked.Scope)
assert.Empty(t, blocked.Username)
assert.Empty(t, blocked.Subject)
assert.Empty(t, blocked.Audience)
}
assertAllowedIntrospection := func(token string) {
t.Helper()
req = NewRequestWithValues(t, "POST", "/login/oauth/introspect", map[string]string{
"token": token,
})
req.SetBasicAuth(clientA.ClientID, clientA.ClientSecret)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
allowed := new(introspectResponse)
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(resp.Body.Bytes(), allowed))
assert.True(t, allowed.Active)
assert.Equal(t, "openid profile", allowed.Scope)
assert.Equal(t, resourceOwner.Name, allowed.Username)
assert.Equal(t, strconv.FormatInt(resourceOwner.ID, 10), allowed.Subject)
assert.Equal(t, jwt.ClaimStrings{clientA.ClientID}, allowed.Audience)
}
assertBlockedIntrospection(tokenParsed.AccessToken)
assertAllowedIntrospection(tokenParsed.AccessToken)
assertBlockedIntrospection(tokenParsed.RefreshToken)
assertAllowedIntrospection(tokenParsed.RefreshToken)
}
func testOAuthGrantScopesReadUserFailRepos(t *testing.T) {
user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
accessToken := issueOAuthAccessTokenForScope(t, user, "openid read:user")